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Kyle T. Scanlan 
This thesis describes the significant events of the Civil 
Rights Movement from 1960 to 1965, examining the campaigns 
of Albany, Georgia in 1962, Birmingham, Alabama in 1963, and 
Selma, Alabama in 1965. In the wake of the Freedom Rides of 
1960-61, Martin Luther King’s Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference was looking for a way to dramatically reveal the 
racial injustice of the South. Stumbling into a campaign in 
Albany, SCLC found the right method in the use of nonviolent 
direct action. While Albany was a failure, it was this 
campaign that led to the campaigns of Birmingham and Selma, 
which resulted in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Through 
confrontation with law enforcement, SCLC was able to effect 
meaningful social change. 
 
The research for this thesis included both primary and 
secondary sources. Newspaper accounts, especially from the 
New York Times, were used as well as magazine articles. All  
three main chapters contain accounts by the participants, 
activists, and politicians. 
 
The conclusion from the research would indicate that it was 
through the use of confrontation with Southern law 
enforcement that the Civil Rights Movement was able to force 





















This thesis is dedicated to Dr. Thomas 
R. Peake, the man who first taught me  
the wonder of the Civil Rights 
Movement and just how vital 
and meaningful 






















 I would first like to thank my Thesis Advisor, Dr. 
Elwood Watson, for his help and guidance in completing this 
project. I would also like to thank my friends for lending 
their support and providing an outlet when things looked 
bleak. Also, thanks to my father, for his help, both 
financial and otherwise, to aid in making this project a 
reality. And finally I would like to thank Max Hermann for 
providing the employment and patience that allowed me to not 




















ABSTRACT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 
DEDICATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
 
Chapter 
 1. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
 2. ONE SHREWD YET RETROGRADE SHERIFF. . . . . . . . 13 
 3. CONFRONTATION IN THE STREETS. . . . . . . . . . .38 
 4. AIN'T GONNA LET NO ONE TURN ME ROUND. . . . . . .70 
 5. CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95 













The Civil Rights Movement in the United States 
essentially began the same time that the country did. 
Beginning with the Abolitionist movement to end the 
“peculiar institution” of slavery, through the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, and into the Industrial Age, the United 
States has always grappled with the problem of race. In his 
1903 classic study on race relations, The Souls of Black 
Folk, Dr. W.E.B. DuBois wrote that, “the problem of the 
Twentieth Century is the problem of the color line.”1 
 DuBois was not far off in his assessment. During this 
century race had become the number one social ill in the 
nation. It was disguised as class struggles, economic woes, 
wars and manifested itself in other forms.  
There were many valiant attempts during the Twentieth 
Century to improve the state of race relations, but all of 
them were doomed to minimal success. DuBois and Booker T. 
Washington were both great leaders, but their squabbling 
over methods and ideology derailed many of their best 
                                                          
1 WEB DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk (Chicago: A.C. 
McClurge and Co., 1903), xi. 
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efforts. Marcus Garvey, the flamboyant leader of the UNIA 
(United Negro Improvement Association), had one of the  
largest followings of any Black leaders in the history of 
the United States, but rampant corruption within his 
organization coupled with the chronic investigations and his 
eventual imprisonment by the federal government ended his 
career. All of these leaders were unable to see their goals 
reach fruition. Decades would pass before the desolate 
plight of Black Americans would etch itself into American 
society. 
 In the 1950s, a series of several victories in the 
courts engineered by Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund culminated in the 1954 Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka decision seemed to open the floodgates 
for change.2 The case, which struck down the 1896 precedent 
of “separate but equal”, established in the case of Plessy 
v. Ferguson3 marked the beginning of the erosion of 
entrenched systematized segregation. This decision was 
really the beginning of the modern Civil Rights Movement, 
marked with effective protest and actual results. Harry 
                                                          
2 347 U.S. (1954). 
 
3 163 U.S. (1896). 
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Ashmore went as far as to say, “without the Brown decision, 
there would have been no Civil Rights Movement.”4   
 The Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955-56 was one of the 
earliest events in the modern Civil Rights Movement. Under 
the leadership of MIA (Montgomery Improvement Association) 
President Martin Luther King Jr. Blacks used the nonviolent 
resistance technique of a mass boycott on the city bus 
system. After a protracted campaign, the Montgomery 
Improvement Association forced the end of segregation on 
public transit in the city. King, who was quite interested 
in social justice and equality, saw that he had the model 
for bringing about the end of Jim Crow in the South.  
 Meanwhile in Little Rock, tensions were building in 
1957 as Arkansas attempted to comply with the Brown 
decision. That fall, as the plan of integration was being 
carried out, violence erupted. President Eisenhower was 
forced to federalize the Arkansas National Guard and call in 
regular US Army troops to allow nine teenage children the 
right to attend school. Due to the shorter time span of 
events and the confrontational spectacle that erupted, this 
made for greater public exposure for television cameras. It  
                                                          
4 Harry Ashmore, Civil Rights and Wrongs: A Memoir of Race 
and Politics, 1944-1994, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), 
96. 
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was Little Rock that first placed the burgeoning Civil 
Rights Movement dramatically into the nation’s living rooms, 
and it was this campaign that gave King an education on how 
to manipulate the modern media to aid his efforts. 
 With the arrival of television, King saw that his 
philosophy of nonviolent resistance had a natural ally. The 
point of nonviolence is to protest injustice and oppression 
while at the same time rising above the temptation to 
uselessly fight back violently in a battle that cannot be 
won. With the aid of television, King hoped to build on the 
lessons of Montgomery and Little Rock and use nonviolent 
resistance tactics to educate the nation to the racial 
injustice that was rampant in the South. Then, with the 
nation suitably outraged, the government would be forced 
into protecting the rights of Black Americans. Vilifying 
local Southern authority as the bad guys on television would 
allow victory for the movement.  
 The years from 1960 to 1965 were the high water mark of 
the modern Civil Rights Movement. Under the leadership of 
Dr. King’s organization, SCLC, (the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference), the Movement managed to change the 
nation.  
  10 
 
 In 1962 in Albany, Georgia, SCLC and SNCC (the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) attempted to wage the 
first large scale campaign to secure integration of public 
facilities and voting rights in the city. Here, the Movement 
was met with defeat due to the skillful, yet, retograde 
intelligence of Sheriff Laurie Prichett. Prichett was well 
schooled in the methods of Martin Luther King and was well 
aware of King’s use of Gandhian tactics. The Albany Sheriff 
knew what the campaign was designed to do, provoke him and 
his men into violence, thus Prichett used nonviolence to 
combat nonviolence, therefore, stymieing the efforts of King 
and his supporters.  
 King knew that in the wake of failure at Albany, the 
Movement needed to do something profound in 1963. Little 
could he have dreamed that it was the events of that year 
that would result in Congress passing the following year 
meaningful civil rights legislation for the first time since 
Reconstruction. In 1963, SCLC decided to implement a 
campaign in Birmingham, Alabama. Here they met their desired 
result, as police chief Bull Connor reacted in the manner 
SCLC anticipated. The mass arrests of protesters were 
accompanied by the use of fire hoses and police dogs, and 
the nation watched the coverage on television, stunned. 
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Violence got so bad that President Kennedy was forced to 
station troops in various parts of the state to be used if 
the situation did not calm down. By the summer of 1963, with 
Kennedy’s Civil Rights Bill on the floor of Congress, civil 
rights organizations staged the March on Washington to apply 
pressure to the government. With 250,000 marchers standing 
in front of the Lincoln Memorial, King gave his legendary “I 
Have a Dream” speech.  
 That September, tragedy once again occurred in 
Birmingham, as a bomb killed four Black girls at the 16th 
Street Baptist Church. Violence erupted, and by the end of 
the day six people were dead. In November 1963 John F. 
Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas and Lyndon Johnson became 
President. Johnson’s legislative skills aided in passing 
Kennedy’s bill, and in 1964, President Johnson signed into 
law the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5  
 On the heels of a victory in Birmingham, King’s next 
focus was voting rights. While launching the statewide 
Alabama Project, SCLC decided to stage a campaign in Selma, 
Alabama. Dallas County Sheriff Jim Clark harbored many of 
the racist values of Bull Connor, and once again SCLC 
planned on exposing the violence of the police to 
demonstrate the evils of Jim Crow. In this campaign, the 
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movement was emphasizing the injustice of being deprived of 
the right to vote. The campaign went smoothly until March 7,  
1965. While beginning a planned march to the state capital, 
the marchers were routed by police with tear gas, cattle 
prods, and billy clubs. “Bloody Sunday” was the turning 
point. The march went on, and as President Johnson was 
forced to get involved, he decided that the time was now 
right to force a voting rights bill through Congress. His 
Administration had been stalling on sending more civil 
rights legislation to Congress, but Johnson decided that 
King had given him a perfect opportunity to pass a voting 
rights bill. The President turned out to be correct, and on 
August 6, 1965, Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act of 
1965.6  
 These events changed the lives of all Americans. Due to 
the combination of good leadership, determination, 
influence, as well as intense coverage by the media,  
segregation faced a severe setback in the American South. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 377 U.S.(1964). 
6 437 U.S.(1965). 
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CHAPTER 2 
ONE SHREWD, YET RETROGRADE SHERIFF 
 
Martin Luther King, Jr. formed the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (SCLC) in 1957 in the hope that the 
future that held the dissolution of racial equality.1 Dr. 
King, fresh off the victory of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 
had an ultimate objective, racial justice, and he had a 
refined method of nonviolent resistance that he intended to 
employ. However, what King lacked was a specific area in 
which to implement these plans. In 1961, with the ever 
increasing idealism sweeping the nation with the 
inauguration of John F. Kennedy, the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) was organized, and it was with 
this young, energetic group that an explicit plan of attack 
against segregation came to fruition. The use of sit-ins, 
boycotts, voter registration drives, and freedom marches 
were all planned and organized.2 Forced to capture the 
attention of young people, SCLC was looking for something to 
captivate the nation as Montgomery had done. 
                                                          
1 Andrew Young, An Easy Burden: the Civil Rights Movement 
and the Transformation of America (New York: Harper Collins: 
1996), 1. 
 
2 James Forman, The Making of Black Revolutionaries 
(Seattle: Open Hand Publishing, 1985), 145. 
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At this point, the movement turned its attention  
towards Albany, a small town in southwest Georgia with great 
racial diversity and deeply rooted racist sentiments. SNCC 
had agreed to send two activists, Charles Sherrod and 
Cordell Reagon, into Terrell County, where Albany was 
located, to begin organizing the black community through 
voter registration. Many activists viewed Terrell County as 
the most stagnant and formidable county in the South. The 
Black community was terrified of economic retribution by the 
White community, and the White community was comforted by 
the considerable financial advantage they held over the 
Blacks. 
Terrell County was located in one of the most 
unfavorable areas for African Americans in the United 
States. The names the activists had associated with the 
counties in Southwest Georgia told the story: “Dogging 
Douglas”, “Unmitigated Mitchell”, “Lamentable Lee”, 
“Unbearable Baker”, and “Unworthy Worth”.3 
 Dr. King and SCLC did not organize the Albany campaign 
and they were never in control of the demonstrations. They 
were invited to Albany by SNCC. They arrived on the scene to 
find a Black community that was largely inactive in the  
                                                          
3 Forman, The Making of Black Revolutionaries, 248. 
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context of the Movement. It was said that, “even the local 
NAACP was quiet until the 1961 Interstate Commerce decree 
ordering integration of buses and depots.”4 Tension in the 
city culminated when the two young SNCC workers, Cordell 
Reagon and Charles Sherrod, arrived in Albany in October of 
1961 to prepare for the voter registration campaign. The two 
field workers received very little support from the black 
community.5 Many people, including ministers, felt that if 
they allowed the activists into their homes, it would 
endanger themselves and their families by provoking white 
supremacist reaction. After a month, both men had generally 
won the community over, but there was still a small degree 
of bitterness towards the “outsiders.”6 
  It came as no surprise that when SNCC sent Sherrod and 
Reagon to the hot, southwest corner of Georgia the two of 
them encountered a formidable task: Albany. In his seminal 
work on race relations The Souls of Black Folk, DuBois 
presented a portrait of the landscape, “ For a radius of a 
hundred miles about Albany stretch a great, fertile land,  
                                                          
4 Thomas Peake, Keeping the Dream Alive (New York: Peter 
Lang Publishing, 1987), 88. 
 
5 Jim Bishop, The Days of Martin Luther King (New York: GP   
Putnam and Sons, 1971), 248. 
 
6 Peake, Keeping the Dream Alive, 88. 
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luxuriant with forests of pine, oak, ash, hickory, and 
poplar, hot with the sun and damp from the rich swampland; 
and here the cornerstone of the cotton kingdom was laid.”7  
The most effective tool that the segregationists had in 
their arsenal was fear. If the black community feared 
unwarranted violence from the police, they would remain 
quiet. If the black community feared the unpunished  
vigilante beatings or lynching by incensed mobs, they would 
remain quiet. If the black community was afraid of 
disturbing the normalcy of centuries of segregation, they 
would remain quiet. But several factors, World War II, 
television, and the deep, seething resentment within the 
black community were aspiring to overturn the prevailing 
social order, and the time was ripe for change.  
In early October of 1961, Reagon and Sherrod moved into 
Albany and set up office in a small, rundown building two 
blocks from the Mt. Zion Baptist Church and the Shiloh 
Baptist Church, in a section of town known as Harlem.8 Their 
initial task was to register voters. Albany consisted of a 
large black population that had swelled to 40 percent by 
                                                          
7 WEB DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk (Chicago: A.C. 
McClurge and Co., 1903), 143. 
 
8 Fred Powledge, Free at Last (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Co., 1991), 341. 
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1962, but its influence in the community was greatly 
lacking. Terrell was a county with about 11,500  
people, and about 60 percent of those were black people, yet 
only 52 black citizens were registered to vote9, a 
staggering indication of the powerful intimidation that had 
been ingrained within the Black community.  
SCLC believed that much of the respect and influence in 
the black community fell to the local ministers, and if they 
could recruit and mobilize these men, much of the community 
would follow their example. SNCC, however, had a decidedly 
different strategy. Their aim was to recruit as many young 
people as possible. Their thinking was that if they managed 
to engage the young people, the older citizens would become 
involved to protect their children and maintain the respect 
their children had for them.10 
On the first day of November 1961, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission issued a regulation outlawing 
segregation in interstate transport terminals. Within a 
short time, Sherrod and Reagon had convinced college 
students from Albany State College to sit-in at White bus  
                                                          
9 John Ansboro, The Making of a Mind (New York: Orbis Books, 
1982), 82.  
 
10 Aldon Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement, 
(New York: The Free Press, 1984), 240. 
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terminals and as SNCC hoped, the entire community solidified 
around the efforts of their children. This raised the ire of 
the NAACP, because the students recruited by SNCC largely 
belonged to the NAACP Youth Council of Albany. The more 
austere organization was worried both about its reputation 
and a concern that SNCC, a relatively untested organization, 
would end up getting the children sent to jail, and the 
NAACP would end up footing the bill to have them freed. 
However, the energy of the movement was capturing the 
imagination of the people in Albany. In an effort to avoid 
internecine warfare among the civil rights organizations, on 
November 17, 1961, the Ministerial Alliance, the Federation 
of Women’s Clubs, the Negro Voters League, the Criterion 
Club, the NAACP as well as SNCC decided to come together 
under an inclusive name: the Albany Movement.11 Dr. William 
Anderson, a respected medical doctor who had not lived in 
the community long enough to make enemies and had precious 
little experience in organized civil rights work, was 
elected president of the Albany Movement.12 
The Albany Movement was unique in many ways. Most  
                                                          
11 David Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King and 
the SCLC (New York: Morrow and Co, 1986), 176. 
 
12 Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement, 241. 
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importantly, the goals of the movement differed 
drastically from the previous movements. Instead of 
concentrating on a single goal, it was decided that this 
movement would end all forms of racial discrimination in 
Albany, Georgia. Demonstrations would be held against 
segregated buses, libraries, bowling alleys, restaurants, 
swimming pools, and other facilities.13 Somehow, through all 
of this, the SNCC recruiters had conveyed to the people that 
it was no longer disgraceful to go to jail if it was for a 
noble and just cause. Slowly, the timidity of the black 
community was dissolving, and they began to fight for their 
convictions, even if it meant they were going to jail for 
them. Never before would such a large number of people have 
gone to jail in Albany. It would appear that some sort of 
boiling point was imminent.14  
A few weeks after the initial confrontation in the  
terminal, on November 22, five Albany State students went to 
eat inside the Trailways station to test the ICC ruling. 
Unfortunately for the students, they were the first in the 
Albany Movement to confront the city’s sheriff, Laurie  
Prichett. Commenting on the eventual arrests, Prichett  
                                                          
13 Morris, 241. 
 
14 Ibid., 242. 
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pointed out that the five students were cited for failing to 
obey the orders of a law enforcement officer, a city 
ordinance, and that the incident had nothing to do with 
interstate commerce.15 This was not a foreseen development. 
Prichett was not the stereotypical southern sheriff. He was 
35, an Elk, Shriner, Rotarian, and a Mason. He did not use 
the word “nigger” in public as did many of his 
contemporaries, and he refrained from using tobacco in 
public or engaging in any other stereotypical activity that 
would characterize him as an ignorant southerner. He was 
primarily interested in doing his job fairly and enforcing 
the laws of Albany and the State of Georgia.16 These traits 
would later serve him well as the national press focused on 
the showdown in Albany months later.  
Prichett had done his homework. He read nonviolent 
theory and practice, especially those tactics used by SNCC 
and SCLC. He knew that King’s brand of nonviolence was 
derived from the protest philosophies of Gandhi and 
Thoreau,17 and he was aware of the fact that Sherrod and  
                                                          
15 Juan Williams, Eyes on the Prize:America’s Civil Rights 
Years 1954-1965.(New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 167 
 
16 Powledge, 353. 
 
17 Peake, 91. 
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Reagon were circulating certain ideas of Thoreau among the 
people. Thoreau said that the only place for a just and 
principled man was jail, and if one person would stand 
against the wrongs of the establishment, then the entire 
regime was doomed to fail, inevitably.18  
As the champion of liberation for the people of India, 
Gandhi, in combination with Thoreau and others, provided a 
basic philosophical framework for Dr. King to infuse his own 
ideas to combat Jim Crow in the south. King agreed with 
Gandhi that the result of an effort did not justify the 
action taken to achieve that result.19 Later, in his “Letter 
From Birmingham Jail”, King argued that Sheriff Prichett had 
used nonviolent tactics to maintain an immoral injustice, 
and that such action was worse than the naked hatred of Bull 
Connor.  
By this time, King had nearly perfected his 
implementation of passive resistance. He demanded that all 
protest be completely peaceful and that his activists 
conduct themselves in a loving manner with integrity. As a 
result, when Sheriff Prichett began to counteract 
                                                          
18 Henry David Thoreau. Civil Disobedience (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1985), 56. 
 
19 Peake, 16. 
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nonviolence with nonviolence, the movement was not at all 
certain how to respond.  
Prichett was well prepared. He knew how Dr. King 
thought and made a few simple realizations. By studying the 
thought and method of such men as Thoreau, Gandhi, King, and 
Tolstoy, Prichett realized that nonviolence was most 
effective when there was violence for it to play off of. 
This was especially true in the Civil Rights Movement, which 
used this confrontational strategy especially well for 
television, where the brutality was on display for all to 
see. Prichett saw that he could render nonviolence useless 
by combating it forcefully, with nonviolence. And so, when 
those five students were arrested on November 25, 1961, 
Prichett was there personally and took them into custody 
politely and without malice.20 Almost immediately, SNCC saw 
that they were in for a different kind of campaign and were 
not sure how to respond.  
Sheriff Prichett had sensed the growing hostility 
between the White and Black communities and in response he 
had retrained his police force accordingly. He visited 
places that had already felt the impact of the movement, 
like Little Rock, and had asked questions in light of his  
                                                          
20 Peake,90.  
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own understanding of passive resistance. According to a 1962 
issue of US News and World Report, Prichett, “held daily 
classes in how to handle demonstrators without force or 
violence. He hammered home the idea that physical contact 
should be avoided, no police dogs used, no tear gas fired or 
nightsticks swung-except in extreme cases.”21 
Prichett’s main intention was keeping the peace. Any 
sign of disturbance was very alarming to him, and it seemed  
that all other considerations became secondary if the calm 
of the community was in jeopardy. But as James Forman noted, 
“Peace and quiet meant maintaining segregation and 
oppression.”22 On a few occasions Prichett dealt firmly with 
whites who threatened trouble. During the campaign a group 
of Ku Klux Klan members checked into an Albany hotel for 
unspecified reasons. He brought the men into his office and 
expressed concern over any violence that might break out. 
Prichett threatened to arrest them if they acted unwisely or 
even visited certain parts of town, especially Harlem.23  
After the arrest of the five students, the SNCC 
workers’ next move was to organize a large protest 
                                                          
21 “Now it’s Passive Resistance by Whites-The Albany, GA 
Plan” US News and World Report 3 September 1962, 46. 
 
22 Forman, 253. 
 
23 “Keep Walking” Newsweek. 13 August 1962, 18. 
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demonstration among a group of high school students, as well 
as holding several nonviolence workshops.24 All of the 
forces were in place and the attack on Jim Crow in Albany 
was about to begin in earnest. On November 25, the Albany 
Movement held its first mass meeting, singing spirituals and 
listening to testimonials from the five students who had 
been arrested. More importantly, the anger over the arrests 
had mended the rift between the NAACP and SNCC.  
 On November 27, the five students were tried, and a 
mass rally was held on the sidewalk outside the courthouse. 
The south was stunned. After generations of apathy, Albany’s 
blacks engaged in a massive nonviolent protest that rocked 
the community, disrupting civil order for almost a year. 
This was perhaps the largest community protest since the bus 
boycott in Montgomery about five years earlier. 
Consequently, the intensity and ostensible unity in the 
Movement brought much national attention, from front-page 
headlines, to a future Nobel Peace Prize for King, to 
concern and action from the White House. 
As the protesters continued to demonstrate in bus 
stations and lunch counters, Prichett continued to make  
arrests and effectively obstructed the activists’ movements.  
                                                          
24 Hanes Walton Jr., The Political Philosophy of Martin 
Luther King (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1971), 128. 
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 On December 10, ten Freedom Riders rode into Albany 
from Atlanta via-integrated train. As they disembarked and 
attempted to integrate the train station, eight of them were 
arrested for trespassing.25 After matter-of-factly arresting 
SCLC Youth Director Bernard Lee and SNCC militant James 
Forman, two of the eight activists involved, Prichett 
commented, “We will not stand for these troublemakers coming 
into our city for the sole purpose of disturbing the peace 
and quiet of the city of Albany.”26 As the demonstrations 
and massive arrests continued without tangible result, a 
sort of paranoia descended upon Albany. However, the arrests 
of the Freedom Riders did bring the national press to Albany 
to monitor the situation. The next day, Forman, just 
released from jail, led a march of 267 Black students to the 
train station. All of them were arrested and, true to SNCC’s 
avowed tactics, refused bail.27 Two days later, Slater King, 
Vice-President of the Albany Movement, led 200 protesters to 
city hall. Predictably, all 200 were soon on their way to 
jail, arrested for parading without a permit.28 
                                                          
25 Williams, Eyes on the Prize, 167.  
 
26 Morris, 242. 
 
27 Williams, 168. 
 
28 Ibid., 168. 
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Jails brimmed with activists. Many citizens were afraid 
of being caught up in all of the disturbances and the 
streets were virtually empty. Commerce in the town was in 
dire straits as a result. Dr. Anderson observed that,  
“Albany was literally paralyzed for about a month. Nobody 
went into the town to shop, black or white. They never knew 
when another mass demonstration was going to break out, and 
no one knew if there was going to be a shooting war.”29 
Hundreds of blacks were stuck in jail, some in terribly 
overcrowded conditions. In a single cell designed for six 
inmates, fifty-four girls were left to arrange themselves as 
best they could.30 No one was happy with the state of 
affairs. The White community was incensed at the Black 
community because they were disturbing the serenity of the 
long-quiet town. However, the Black community drew on their 
own strength under the movement’s leadership.     
Consequently, in mid-December, the city agreed to hold 
an unofficial conference with the Albany Movement to see if 
they could make some sort of “arrangement”, but the two  
groups reached an impasse. The leaders of the Movement had 
very little leverage, and they were left without a 
                                                          
29 Stephen Oates, Let The Trumpet Sound. (New York: Penguin 
Books,1982), 182. 
 
30 Oates, Let the Trumpet Sound. 183. 
  27 
 
resolution in the face of intransigent Albany officials. Dr. 
Anderson feared that the activists would quickly grow 
discouraged, and the Albany Movement would be dissolved if 
something was not done to reinvigorate the people.31 
Anderson believed that SNCC had provided what was needed, a 
stimulus, but once the movement got going it did not have 
the resources for such a massive undertaking.32  
And so, despite the pleas of some of the SNCC workers, 
Dr. Anderson placed a phone call to Atlanta and asked former 
classmate Martin Luther King to come to Albany. James Forman 
was particularly against this, remarking that, “…it was 
important to keep the Albany Movement a people’s 
movement…and the presence of Dr. King would detract from 
this focus.”33 SNCC believed that because the media had 
already converged on the events in Albany, the attention 
King would bring would be obtrusive and unnecessary. They 
thought that the strength of the people would carry them 
through and did not need a “messiah” figure to assume 
control. 
Until now, King had been watching the events unfold  
from SCLC headquarters in Atlanta. The campaign, however,  
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was failing because of the difficulty in unifying a movement 
with so many leaders.34 King had no intention of getting 
permanently involved at Albany (he did not even bring a 
toothbrush), but he agreed to come and make an appearance. 
He had always commented on filling the jails of the South, 
and this seemed like an appropriate time for him to get 
involved. However, there was discontent among the rank and 
file that after all of their hard work and sacrifice, King 
would show up and pull off a “miracle.” According to one 
Black citizen, “Mr. King is not quite the Moses to lead us 
out of our troubles.”35 Dissenting opinions from certain 
segments of the Black community only further complicated an 
already precarious situation, and conflicts deepened as the 
Albany Movement seemed headed for a collapse. 
King, however, came through and managed to give one of 
his best speeches at the Shiloh Baptist Church upon his 
arrival. His words from that message are well known and 
would be repeated countless times. “We shall overcome. Don’t 
stop now. Keep moving. Don’t get weary children. We will 
wear them down by our capacity to suffer.”36 But his words 
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came to no effect until later, for the Albany campaign was 
doomed to fall short.  
Despite all of the obstacles faced by King, SNCC, and 
SCLC and the integration activists having to contend with in 
the austere racism of the white community and the latent law 
enforcement of tactics of Chief Prichett, they had yet to 
contend with their most malicious foe: James Grey, of the 
Albany Herald. Albany was a place that did not concern 
itself with the outside world, and, as a result, was a place 
that was highly conducive for someone of white supremacist 
thought like Grey. His favorite journalistic “technique” was 
to fashion stories that depicted blacks as a highly ignorant 
and inferior people.      
Grey never attempted to be impartial in his 
journalistic approach. Belittling, demeaning, or undermining 
the goals of the activists, Grey constantly manipulated the 
people of Albany and reinforced the community mores with his 
own racist thoughts.37 According to Newsweek, “Grey has 
fulfilled the traditional role of editor-as-community-leader 
by simply giving his readers what they want-a viewpoint 
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insulated against the fires of social change, stubbornly 
conservative, rigidly segregationist.”38  
Grey gave himself away as he attempted to relay the 
arrest of Dr. King and others in September of 1962: “Crowd 
Cheers as Cops Clap Clerical Crowd in Calaboose.” In the 
accompanying article, Grey claimed, “The racial problem in 
Albany has been overemphasized. It’s not a real story.”39 
The brazen and offensive journalism produced by Grey 
probably would not have been such a disturbance if it was 
not consumed and confirmed by the white community. One man 
was quoted as saying, “The Herald reflects the attitudes in 
Albany. If the Paper says a chicken dips snuff, you can lift 
up it’s [sic] right wing and find a box there.”40  
Dr. King seeing the urgency of the situation, decided 
to stay, declaring, “We will plague this community with all 
of our determination…I will be in Albany until next January 
if these problems aren’t solved.”41 A few days later on 
December 16, King was jailed with 250 other protesters and 
promised to spend Christmas in jail unless the movement’s 
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demands were met. However, the city took away this strategy 
by concocting a strange technicality that allowed his 
release and foiled his plans, deflating any momentum that 
his imprisonment might have established.42 Albany refused to 
blatantly confront the campaigners with any degree of 
finality unless they exhibited some degree of rowdy  
behavior that posed a threat to the townspeople. Because the 
philosophy of the protesters was similar, a stalemate was 
inevitable.43  
So King continued the demonstrations into the spring, 
until he and several other of the leaders, and two hundred 
protesters, were tried and convicted for the December march, 
and once again, they promised to stay in jail until the 
situation was resolved.44 But once again, Prichett outwitted 
them. He forced them out of jail, saying, “An unidentified, 
well-dressed black man had paid their bail.”45 King had once 
said that Laurie Prichett was the finest police chief he had 
met in the south, and it seems that a sense of mutual 
respect had developed between the two men. However, King 
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realized that Prichett was not genuinely concerned with 
justice, and he felt hurt and betrayed.    
King agreed to leave jail upon the condition that the 
city officials would return all of the bond money, release 
all of the jailed protesters on their own recognizance, 
postpone the trials of the protesters indefinitely, 
desegregate the busses immediately, and finally, establish a 
permanent biracial committee to work out the details of 
desegregating the city.46 Within days, it became clear that 
the city would uphold none of these promises, and King felt 
that he had not kept his own promise and should have stayed 
in jail.  
The final nonviolent showdown came on the night of July 
24, after nearly six months of inactivity during 
negotiations between the city and the Albany Movement. That 
night, nearly 3,000 blacks gathered in the street and began 
marching towards the center of town. One hundred sixty 
officers met the wave of protesters, and true to form,  
Prichett asked King if the marchers had a demonstration 
permit. Dr. King said no, and the mass arrests began to 
incur yet again. However, on that night, out of months of 
frustration, some of the marchers began to throw rocks and 
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other objects at the police.47 “But not one of my men ever 
lifted his nightstick from his belt,” Prichett reported with 
pride, even joking about the “nonviolent rocks”. “We broke 
the backs of the lawbreakers that night. The black’s 
nonviolent movement became violent, and when that happened, 
the Negroes lost a lot of sympathizers-here and in other 
places.”48 And it was true, the tide had turned and the hope 
for victory in Albany was lost. King was arrested yet again, 
and was released August 10, upon intervention from the 
Justice Department.    
King returned to Atlanta, intending to rest and allow 
the local leadership to continue negotiations with the city. 
However, even after he departed, city leaders refused to 
meet with officials from the Albany Movement. The city 
fathers claimed that they wanted, “a new and responsible 
voice for the colored citizens of Albany.”49 On August 15, 
King returned to Albany, and local leaders finally got to 
meet with the mayor. No agreement could be reached, and all 
the Movement leaders could do was hold a press conference. A 
few days later, King left Albany. But while he was gone, Dr.  
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Anderson called a halt to all activity in the Albany area. 
The situation was now resolved in favor of racial injustice. 
King was disgusted over the way the last demonstration had 
gone, so much so that he gave serious consideration to 
quitting the movement.50 
 After King departed, 75 northern protesters came to 
Albany Labor Day weekend to show support for the Albany 
Movement. Prichett gave the new arrivals no better treatment 
than King received, arresting all of them, while admonishing 
them, “Go back to your homes. Clear your own cities of sin 
and lawlessness.”51 
 The meetings in Albany continued for another six years. 
In that respect SNCC could claim a partial victory. Albany 
was an important lesson in how to organize a community 
during sustained protest efforts. SNCC would have great 
success applying the lessons learned in Albany in 
Mississippi during Freedom Summer two years later.   
 After some rest and a reflection on the lessons 
learned in Albany, King resumed his work. Looking back at 
the campaign, he remarked that the purposes of the campaign 
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had been. “so vague that we got nothing and people were left 
depressed and in despair.”52 
The shortcomings of the Albany Movement were readily 
apparent. The dissension between SNCC and the SCLC robbed 
the movement of its cohesion and the unity of the people. 
Communication between the two organizations became better in 
the years ahead to avoid this issue, although differences 
would always be there between the two organizations. Many in 
SNCC thought also that King’s conservatism was to blame, 
that is, he was only willing to go so far in his measures 
and goals. Moreover, there was a lingering resentment in 
SNCC of the publicity King could generate just by arriving 
in a town and calling a press conference. In moments of 
derision, SNCC staffers referred to King as “de lawd” 
because he seemed to be the sole figure in the movement who 
was listened to and given any media exposure.53 
Little preparation had gone into Albany, a problem that 
would be rectified in the later struggles, especially in 
Birmingham and Selma. The goals in Albany were not always 
clear, and it was never certain what concrete demands were  
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behind the protests. In the future, the movement always knew 
to demand specific concessions. This served a twofold 
purpose. One, it kept the issues surrounding the campaign 
from being confused. Also, if the campaign went to the 
federal courts with a petition, one overriding issue, such 
as desegregation of public facilities or voting rights, the 
chances of victory were much improved.  
Another contributing factor to the failure of Albany 
was the lack of intervention from the Kennedy 
Administration. While Kennedy was sympathetic towards the 
movement, at this time there was no real incentive for the 
administration to get involved. The public was not yet 
outraged over segregation. Thanks to Laurie Prichett, King 
could not have the drama that made news and allowed for the 
power of television to graphically demonstrate the evils of 
racism.  
The final blow to the Albany campaign came with the 
failure to act out nonviolence fully. Typically violence on 
the part of the white southerners was the catalyst for 
success. Sympathies were obtained and indifference exploded 
when officials used violence to try and control the black 
community. When these images were focused on television 
every night, the entire nation took an interest in the 
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movement. However, when racist whites were able to derive 
sympathy in the wake of black violence, the Movement lost a 
lot of credibility. SCLC took pains to see that that would 
never happen again.  
Although Albany was considered a failure, many 
important lessons for later campaigns were learned. From 
then on, the SCLC targeted only places where adversity and 
violence would work for them. Also, focusing on a specific 
agenda would be important. In Albany, the Movement was 
probably asking for too much, and so the goals of the 
protesters were somewhat muddied and confusing. This was 
also rectified in later campaigns.  
Albany pointed the way, and King made the journey. He 
led his people, through nonviolence, to a new level of life 
and human dignity. King had learned his lessons, and SCLC, 
in the spirit of Horatio Alger decided to go west, to 
Alabama. King was confident that the city of Birmingham was 
ripe for a campaign, and as 1962 drew to a close, the SCLC 
began to prepare for what would be the most vivid, 
memorable, and important campaign of the entire Civil Rights 
Movement: Birmingham.
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CHAPTER 3 
CONFRONTATION IN THE STREETS  
 
In the wake of the failure at Albany, SCLC decided that 
it needed another campaign to build back the momentum the 
Movement had built before 1962. Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth 
wanted the next campaign to be Birmingham. He recalled 
later, “Dr. Kings’s image was slightly on the wane because 
he had not projected a victory in Albany. I said, I assure 
you, if you come to Birmingham, this movement can not only 
gain prestige, it can really shake the country.”1 During 
this time, Birmingham was a city marked by severe racism. As 
King noted later, it was a city that seemed to have 
forgotten the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution, as well as the Brown 
decision.2 Blacks were discriminated against in public 
facilities such as restaurants, hotels, and restrooms, and 
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also in areas such as voting rights and employment 
opportunities.3   
Another lesson learned from Albany was the importance 
of the media. Television coverage of the early 1960s began 
to focus on racial demonstrations.  
For a nation that had grown used to de facto 
segregation in all aspects of society, television 
transcended boundaries and brought the modern Civil Rights 
Movement directly into the nation’s living rooms. Because of 
television coverage, nonviolent demonstrators, picket lines, 
brutal police response, heckling bigots, and other factors 
exposed the nation to the necessity and intensity of the 
movement.   
 When SCLC delegates met in Birmingham in September 1962 
for their annual convention, entitled, “Human Rights: The 
Continuing Struggle,” speakers emphasized the necessity and 
the meaning of nonviolence. Guest speaker Jackie Robinson, 
who carried an immense amount of respect within the Black 
community as the first black man to play Major League 
Baseball, among other dignitaries, urged Blacks outside the 
South to become aware of the disgraceful living conditions 
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and try to rectify them by supporting the movement.4 SCLC 
Executive Director Wyatt T. Walker reported to the 
convention that he spent his first full year on the job 
laying out the long- range plan for SCLC, and he noted the 
role of the new citizenship programs in those plans. Walker 
felt that efforts in this direction would soon meet with 
success.5  
Although a big believer in voter registration and 
training, the temperamental Walker was not a gradualist, and 
he knew that SCLC needed a crisis to regain momentum and 
reach a new plateau after the debacle at Albany. At that 
same convention, he and other SCLC leaders were already 
beginning to lay the groundwork to make Birmingham the major 
campaign for 1963.  
 Indeed, locals had already been fearful that the SCLC 
convention would bring demonstrations to the city in the 
previous year, 1962. Since January, the city businesses had 
been hurt by a selective boycott engineered by students at  
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Miles College, but no ground had been gained till it was 
announced that SCLC was gathering for its annual convention. 
While Fred Shuttlesworth and the ACMHR had won victories 
there before, they would always later lose the ground they 
thought that they had gained. With the pressure of SCLC 
coming in for the convention, Shuttlesworth’s organization 
gained some concessions, but typically these were lost when 
the convention was over.6 
 A few days after the convention, news came out of 
neighboring Mississippi that a court order had been issued 
to allow James Meredith to enroll at the University of 
Mississippi at Oxford. King, watching the way Mississippi 
governor Ross Barnett protested, wondered if George Wallace, 
recently nominated candidate for governor of Alabama, might 
win the office and enforce a similar program.     
 Actually, the SCLC was not prepared to begin a campaign 
in Birmingham at that time. Albany was still going on, and 
they needed more time and a lot more planning. So King set 
his sights on the pre-Easter buying season in early 1963 as 
his target date. King was also hopeful that if he waited, 
the Kennedy Administration could act boldly and eliminate 
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the need for confrontation. At this point, King was still 
hopeful that he could force the administration to issue a 
“Second Emancipation Proclamation,” because 1963 was the 
centennial of the first.7 Of course, King knew that 
political barriers blocked the president from taking so bold 
an action, and he was unaware of the looming Cuban missile 
crisis and its aftermath in October 1962 that was crowding 
the rest of Kennedy’s program to the side. The uncertainty 
of federal action made the need for intense preparation for 
Birmingham all the more crucial. 
 As an industrial hub and at the time the most important 
city in the south, Birmingham was replete with 
possibilities. However, the city’s strict tradition of 
segregation, epitomized by police commissioner Eugene “Bull” 
Connor, would not make the task easy. When later asked why 
King chose Birmingham then, he answered that, “… Birmingham 
represented the hard core, recalcitrant, segregationist 
South… with the ugly image created by the Bull Connor 
philosophy of race relations…”8 Connor showed open hostility 
towards Blacks in their struggle for civil rights and 
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towards any attempt made by the federal government to aid in 
that cause.9 It was this attitude that SCLC was hoping to 
exploit. So, the effort in the city was a deliberately 
engineered crisis intended to revitalize the movement after 
the disastrous Albany campaign of 1962 and strike a blow in 
the main citadel of segregation.  
King’s mention of the image of Bull Connor indicated 
that he was also thinking of changing tactics against the 
Kennedy Administration. If he could sway public opinion with 
a dramatic campaign, he could force Kennedy to move more 
deliberately on the Civil Rights front. This policy came to 
the forefront as events unfolded, but it is clear that when 
King went to Birmingham he was looking to provide SCLC the 
clout to not only make changes in that city, but to 
influence national policy. If the Birmingham campaign 
worked, much would obviously be accomplished. However, if it 
failed, then it would at least bring the issue of 
segregation before the court of world opinion and force the 
federal government to act.10 While some scholars saw this as  
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a shift in King’s thought or policy, it really was not. King 
had written as early as 1958, “…the mass movement repudiates 
violence while moving resolutely to its goal, its opponents 
are revealed as the instigators and practitioners of 
violence if it occurs. Then public support is magnetically 
attracted to the advocates of nonviolence.”11 To facilitate 
publicity, each day of the campaign was to begin with a 
press briefing to explain what SCLC was doing and why. 
Andrew Young, one of King’s top lieutenants in SCLC who had 
previous experience working in television, had impressed 
upon King the need to compress the message into sixty 
seconds for television. Young figured the networks would 
allow for two to three minutes for a civil rights story on 
the evening news, and they needed desperately to make good 
use of that time.12 As Young recalled, “That sixty seconds 
was what we were demonstrating for-that sixty second message 
to the world.”13 
 By May of 1962, at a SCLC board meeting, an idea was  
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developed to build a campaign in Birmingham. Word of these  
preparations leaked into the press, resulting in a major 
change in attitude by the merchants in Birmingham.14 They 
realized that something must be done to avoid massive 
protest, and for a short time, it appeared that Birmingham 
could heal itself without the need for protest. However, by 
September 1962, by the time the annual SCLC convention 
concluded, the situation had reverted to the old ways.   
Movement leaders realized that a massive protest effort 
would be needed.15   
 Meanwhile secret preparations continued. In  
December 1962, King and his staff and circle of trusted 
comrades discussed questions of exact timing, focus, and 
various logistical matters. The entire project was coded to 
insure communication and security. The project itself, 
“project C” was soon finalized. Chillingly, King felt that 
not all of the participants would survive the campaign.16  
 If the focus in Albany had been too imprecise, then the 
goals in Birmingham would have to be more focused. It was 
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decided that the downtown merchants would be most 
influential in dropping segregation if they stood to lose 
black business.  Boycotting would be the strongest initial 
weapon. So a boycott of downtown stores for the Easter 
shopping season was the first step. These would begin in 
early March, and six weeks would give ample time to effect 
some changes and hopefully force the city to negotiate. 
While this was happening, King would be fund raising from 
other civil rights groups and SCLC affiliates.17  
 King moved into his headquarters at the Gaston Motel in 
Birmingham in January 1963. Much of his initial time was 
spent persuading the local black upper class to get behind 
him. Conservative by nature, the upper class was miffed that 
they were not consulted on what they saw as an invasion of 
their city. Garnering support of the Black elite was a 
formidable task.  
 Working class Blacks also had to be persuaded. Blacks 
in Birmingham had been lashed down under the brutal forces 
of segregation and poverty for so long that it would be 
difficult to motivate them to engage in demonstrative  
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action. SCLC brought in seasoned activists like C.T. Vivian, 
Andrew Young, James Lawson, Bernard Lee, and James Bevel to 
hold workshops and try and stir up interest. Meanwhile, 
Dorothy Cotton led the effort to mobilize demonstrators, 
provide timetables, lists of participants, and overall 
guidance.18 Momentum was lost before the campaign even 
began. Birmingham had changed from a city commission system 
to a mayor-council government in 1962, and a special mayoral 
election was slated for March 5, 1963. Because they did not 
want to inadvertently help Bull Connor win the office of 
mayor, demonstrations were pushed back until after the 
election. Undoubtedly, Connor could harm blacks in 
Birmingham more from the mayor’s office than as police 
commissioner, thus everything was postponed for two weeks.19 
Once again however, the timetable was interrupted when no 
candidate won a majority, and a runoff election was 
scheduled April 3. In that election, Albert Boutwell 
defeated Bull Connor.20 
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 While King did prefer Boutwell to Connor, he turned 
down a proposal from the new mayor to postpone 
demonstrations to allow the new city government to show  
good faith by bringing in some needed changes. Although 
segregation was deeply entrenched in Birmingham, Connor’s 
style of outlandish and brutish behavior was not looked upon 
favorably in powerful circles in the city. To further muddy 
the waters, the existing regime, headed by Connor and 
incumbent mayor Arthur Hanes, said they would continue to  
serve until their terms expired in 1965. While they were  
expected to lose their court case, it would be at least 
April 15 before the situation was resolved. SCLC decided to 
proceed on April 3.21 
 On April 3, King laid out SCLC’s six-point plan for the 
city. The list was hardly radical: desegregate lunch 
counters and other public facilities, fair hiring practices 
by stores and the city, all charges against demonstrators 
dropped, desegregation of public recreational facilities, 
and to form a biracial commission to study further  
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integration.22 These demands did not seem unreasonable, even  
in Birmingham, but unless the campaign evoked enough 
reaction to have any political clout, the city probably 
would not change. That same day, the first wave of protests 
came in the form of sit-ins at lunch counters, the end 
result being the arrest of all the protesters.23 SCLC had 
held the first mass meeting two nights before on April 4. 
King asked for protest volunteers and told those who 
volunteered to not bring weapons to any demonstration, and 
he outlined nonviolent resistance to impart the importance 
of not instigating pitched battle with the police.24 
Sessions were soon developed to train the volunteers to 
accept the abuse that would come. They were trained, “to 
resist without bitterness; to be cursed and not reply; to be 
beaten and not hit back.”25 
Connor seemed to have taken notes from his colleague in 
Albany, Laurie Prichett, and was handling the demonstrators 
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gently, and even when 42 were arrested during a march to 
city hall on April 6, they were treated with, “amazing 
politeness.”26 Easter was only a few days off and the 
possibility of economic pressure was almost nil, and there 
had not been any massive participation by the Black 
population. SCLC tried to hold nightly rallies to raise 
emotions and find new demonstrators, and these continued  
even after the campaign picked up momentum. However, rallies 
were not enough. By the end of the first week in Birmingham, 
SCLC had nothing at all to show for its meticulous 
preparation. Having spurned the new mayor’s good faith 
gesture, and lost out on the holiday boycott, they were now 
seen as outside agitators, and a number of local black 
leaders seemed to agree.27 To add to the headaches, weapons 
had been found among some of the demonstrators, and they 
needed to be reminded of the basic principles of 
nonviolence.  
Nonetheless, the campaign began to slowly but surely 
pick up speed. The crowds did grow at the rallies and by  
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the second week, beginning April 10th, the jails began to 
become even more crowded. On that same day, State Judge  
William A. Jenkins signed a court order banning further  
demonstrations. In the order, the judge prohibited 133 
people specifically from protesting, with King at the top of 
the list.28 This was a difficult decision for King. To obey 
the court order would be to surrender, but to go to jail, 
especially when SCLC was out of funds to provide bail on 
Easter weekend was a torturous predicament. Especially 
galling was at the mass meeting the next night, only 50 
people signed pledge cards to go to jail with King.29 
All of this pressure caused the Birmingham campaign to 
come to an abrupt halt. The city government’s injunction 
against further protesting said the movement was ordered to, 
“cease activities until (their) right to demonstrate has 
been argued in court.”30 The decision was made to disregard 
the court order, because, as King told the press, “the 
courts of Alabama had misused the judicial process in order 
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to perpetuate injustice and segregation.”31 After King 
concluded his press conference, he decided that he would 
prove his point by going to jail on Good Friday and 
hopefully regain the lost momentum.  
On the day before Good Friday, about two dozen of the  
campaign leaders met at the Gaston Motel to weigh their 
options. After deliberating for a long time, most especially 
over the issues of raising bail money with their most able 
fund raiser behind bars and missing Easter Sunday at their 
respective churches, King retired to his room and changed 
into work clothes, reemerged, and announced that he was 
going to defy the injunction. For the planned protest the 
next day, the usually punctual Wyatt T. Walker tried a new 
strategy. He had noticed that the accounts of the marches in 
the press invariably lumped black observers with the 
demonstrators, and so for the big march on Good Friday, he 
waited to allow the crowd to build. The results of playing 
on the anticipation of the King-Connor showdown came to 
fruition the next day in The New York Times when it was 
reported that, “more than a thousand shouting, singing 
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negroes had joined the demonstration.”32 King and Abernathy 
were leading the march, and when they crossed from 
Seventeenth Street onto Fifth Avenue, a police motorcycle  
stopped them.33 The two leaders knelt down to pray, and 
Connor gave the arrest order, and about four dozen were 
taken to jail.34 
 An extremely busy Wyatt T. Walker sent a telegram to 
President Kennedy. He told the President: 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and the Rev. Ralph B 
Abernathy are presently confined to the Birmingham city 
jail. Both were arrested…in violation of the 
constitutional guarantees of the first and fourteenth 
amendments…We submit that these two distinguished 
Americans are political prisoners and not criminals. We 
ask that you use your high office to persuade the city 
officials of Birmingham to afford at least a modicum of 
human treatment.35   
 
King would remain in solitary confinement for a day. 
King could not call his wife or visit lawyers during this 
time. Coretta Scott King did call the President, and 
Attorney General Robert Kennedy called her back, assuring 
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her that King would be fine. The President called and 
assured Coretta that he was looking into the matter.36  
King was isolated and depressed in the jail, but the  
next day, one of his New York attorneys Clarence Jones 
arrived to inform King that Harry Belafonte had raised 
$50,000 in bail money.37 King was overjoyed but was less so  
at an item that appeared in that day’s Birmingham News, 
which carried an “Appeal for Law and Order and Common Sense” 
signed by eight prominent white Christian and Jewish clergy. 
It criticized the timing of the campaign and raised the old 
southern refrain of ‘outside agitators’ ruining good race 
relations. Taking his attention away from the more pressing 
problems at hand, King, using newspaper edges and a pen 
smuggled into his cell, composed a reply.38 All of King’s 
beliefs and philosophy were about to be crystallized into 
one single piece of writing. In his “Letter From Birmingham 
Jail” King denied that he was an outsider. All communities, 
he argued, are interrelated. “I cannot sit idly by in 
Atlanta and not be concerned about what happens in 
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Birmingham. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice 
everywhere. We are caught in a inescapable network of  
mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny.”39 King went 
on to answer criticism of the demonstrations, wondering why 
they had so much concern for the manifestations of  
discontent, but not the causes. He went through the four 
stages of nonviolence, as well as Thomas Aquinas’ theory on 
just and unjust law. Basically what this theory holds that 
just because a law was passed does not mean that the law is 
always just. Civil disobedience, therefore, was right 
because it was in protest of an unjust law.40 King ended his 
letter with an admonition to the white clergy to keep their 
churches relevant and respond to the challenges of justice. 
The destiny of his people, he claimed, was, “tied up with 
America’s destiny.”41 The letter did not spring quickly to 
acclaim. Not a single mention of it appeared the press for 
about a month. So, while it may seem that King saved his 
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campaign with his pen, the reverse is actually true. The 
movement caught fire and saved the Letter from oblivion.42 
And on April 20th after eight days in jail, King was 
released.   
 Quickly, the SCLC staff convened to plan more 
demonstrations with a new strategy. Youth had been less 
involved in this campaign than in others, and some of the 
leadership pushed to have young people, high school students 
and younger, included in marches planned for early May. 
King, while harboring misgivings about using children, felt 
that they had never known freedom, but did know segregation. 
The use of children had a dramatic effect on the whole 
campaign, and, as a result, the whole nation. James Bevel 
and the other youth recruiters had amassed a nonviolent army 
of about 6,000 young people ready to march.43 
 On May 2, “D-Day”, the most intense portion of the 
campaign was launched. The children emerged from the 16th  
Street Baptist Church and marched into downtown Birmingham.  
When they met Connor and his men, they all were arrested. It 
was reported that, “they scampered almost merrily into the 
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paddy wagons.”44 On that first day of demonstrations, Walker 
announced that of the 958 children to sign pledge cards to 
go to jail, 600 were in custody. At the mass meetings that 
evening, emotions reached a fevered pitch, and 300 more 
people announced themselves ready to go to jail.45 
 It was during the “D-Day” demonstrations that one of 
the more infamous and shocking displays in the history of  
the United States occurred, and it may be this week that 
changed the course of history. The next day, to help control 
the demonstrators, Bull Connor had fire hoses and German 
Shepherd dogs to try and intimidate the crowd. When the 
threat of intimidation failed to work, he ordered the hoses 
to spray on the marchers.46 With the hoses literally 
knocking people down and then forcing them back, Connor lost 
any moral ground that he had and, therefore, lost the war 
for public opinion. This also caused all dissent about the 
need for the campaign itself to evaporate. Hard on the heels 
of absorbing the fact that over one thousand Black children 
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had marched to jail in the previous two days, now the nation 
was treated to images of fire hoses and dogs being used to 
stop a people merely asking for the same rights that most of  
America took for granted. As the dogs were let loose on the 
marchers, Connor told his men, “Look at them run…I want them 
to see the dogs work. Look at those niggers run.”47  
 As for the K-9 units, an AP photographer caught the 
image of a dog with its mouth around a young black boy’s 
abdomen, while on his face is dead calm and he seems to be 
leaning into the attacking dog. The boy, Walter Gadsden, was 
not trained in nonviolence and did not intend to be in the 
demonstration, his reaction crystallized for the nation who 
was right and who was wrong in the matter of Birmingham.48   
 For many bystanders, this was all too much. Soon, 
hundreds of Blacks not trained in nonviolence began to fight 
back. The fire hoses were used again, and more Blacks joined 
the melee. Finally James Bevel offered a deal to the police. 
He would try and disperse the Blacks if they would stop 
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their brutal crowd control tactics. Bevel’s gamble worked 
and the near riot was over.49   
In Washington, President Kennedy watched the events 
unfold on television with deep interest. On May 4th, he 
dispatched Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall to  
the city to try and find resolution. His job was not to 
propose solutions, but to represent the President in any and 
all negotiations.50 King interpreted this as evidence that 
the political pressure he wanted to exert in Washington was 
beginning to pay off. Marshall succeeded, and soon meetings 
were being held between the city and SCLC. These meetings 
would lead to the negotiations that would bring about the 
end of the campaign. 
However, before negotiations could be completed, more 
violence erupted. Groups of Blacks, not officially part of  
the Movement, attacked Connor and his men with bottles and 
rocks. Connor responded with high-pressure fire hoses 
mounted on tripods like machine guns.51 The police at this 
time requested state troops to intervene. 
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On May 7, during a break in the negotiations, white 
businessmen leaving the meeting encountered several thousand 
Blacks protesting outside. By this time, “the jails were so 
full that police could only arrest a handful.”52    
Demonstrations continued until May 9th, when 2,000 
people were in jail and the downtown business district was 
thronged with a seemingly endless mass of protesters.  
It was at this point that the state of Alabama realized that 
it was at a breaking point. Jails were full, budgets for the 
year had already been spent, street officers were stressed 
to the point of cracking, ever present news cameras were 
only adding to that stress, and a divided city leadership, 
so something obviously needed to be done.53  
On May 8, President Kennedy held a press conference. In 
his opening remarks, the President discussed the situation 
in Alabama and told the assembled reporters that he would 
try and use all the power at his disposal to protect the 
citizens of America and uphold the law. He went on to say: 
We can hope that tensions will ease and that this case 
history…will remind every state, every community and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
51 Ibid., 104. 
52 Ibid., 104.  
 
53 Branch, 783. 
  61 
 
every citizen how urgent it is that all bars to equal 
opportunity…be removed as quickly as possible.54  
 
Thanks to around-the-clock negotiations between May 7-
9, a compromise settlement had been reached. With Connor’s 
forces bolstered by 250 state troops, and with 800 more in 
reserve, it looked as though major bloodshed had been 
narrowly averted.55 
 King saw the agreement as a positive one. He titled the 
final chapter of his book Why We Can’t Wait “Black and White 
Together” and it reflected his optimism of that agreement. 
In that book, King says that, “Birmingham may well offer 
twentieth century America an example of progressive racial 
relations, for all mankind a dawn of a new day, a promise 
for all men, a day of opportunity and a new sense of freedom 
for all America.”56 
 The agreement called for the integration of lunch 
counters, restrooms, and drinking fountains within  
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ninety days. There was also a call to end racial 
discrimination in hiring practices, and the biracial 
commission that King called for would be established. Also, 
all of the protesters in jail would be freed, either on bail 
or released on their own recognizance.57  
 If the Birmingham agreement is measured by substance 
and viability, King was mistaken in its effectiveness. The  
settlement had little standing because it was made 
privately, with almost no involvement from the city. Also, 
the announcement had hardly been made when violence erupted 
in the city. Governor George Wallace and the city government 
both rejected the agreement.58 
On May 10th two explosives were thrown from a car, 
damaged the Gaston Motel where King was staying. One bomb 
exploded by the registration desk, and the other destroyed a 
trailer nearby.59  The home of A.D. King, Martin’s brother, 
was also firebombed. The house sustained partial damage, but 
no one was hurt in either incident.60 However, in response, 
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a black mob was formed with thousands of Blacks not trained 
in nonviolence. After the bombings, these people filled the 
streets and started hurling rocks at the police.61 To 
restore order, the police brought in the K-9 units, which 
incited the crowd further. The dogs were taken away, and the 
police tried peaceful negotiation. As this was going on, 
several fires broke out. Thirty-five state troopers were 
brought in armed with guns and billy clubs. They waded into 
the mob, and by 4:30 A.M. the crowd had been dispersed.62   
In retaliation for these outbursts, on May 20 outgoing 
Mayor Hanes expelled 1,000 black students from the city 
schools for participating in the riots.63 With help from the 
NAACP Legal Defense fund, the decision was overturned. 
The situation was deteriorating so badly that President 
Kennedy ordered federal troops be sent to Alabama. Governor 
Wallace decried Kennedy’s action, and announced that he 
planned to file a motion in federal court to have the troops 
removed. Kennedy responded that under the law it was the 
President’s duty to suppress any action in any state that  
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could potentially harm the citizens of that state.64 Kennedy 
had the troops stationed in Anniston and in Montgomery, and 
let Wallace know that they could be dispatched into 
Birmingham if need be. This calmed the more violent 
protests.     
 On May 18th, President Kennedy spoke at Vanderbilt 
University in Nashville in support of the rights of Black 
Americans. And a few weeks later on June 11, Kennedy, in a 
nationally televised address, made clear how he felt about 
the Civil Rights Movement: 
We preach freedom around the world and we mean it. And 
we cherish our freedom here at home. But are we to say 
to the world-and much more importantly-to each other, 
that this is the land of the free…except for Negroes; 
that we have no second class citizens…except for 
Negroes; that we have no class or caste system no 
ghettoes, no master race… except with respect to 
Negroes? Now the time has come for the nation to 
fulfill its promise. The events of Birmingham and 
elsewhere have so increased the cries for equality that 
no city or state legislative body can prudently choose 
to ignore them.65 
 
 While some criticized Kennedy for not delivering this 
speech earlier, that was ignoring the fact that SCLC’s 
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Birmingham campaign had, in Schlesinger’s words, “…given him 
the nation’s ear.”66  
Eight days later, Kennedy sent his long-promised Civil 
Rights Bill to Congress, marking the beginning of the epic 
battle that would end with the passing of the Civil Rights  
Bill of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.   
  In the face of the Kennedy Administration finally  
sending a comprehensive Civil Rights Bill to the floor of 
Congress, the Birmingham campaign was a success. King wanted 
to use the stage of Birmingham to set a fire under the 
conscience of the nation, and in that he succeeded. King 
successfully used the philosophy of nonviolence to bring 
public exposure of injustice, and then used the prevailing 
firestorm of public criticism of his opponent to tear down 
one more bastion of integration. 
To keep up the pressure, civil rights leaders were 
preparing for the March on Washington to attempt to bring 
their own pressure on Congress to pass the Civil Rights 
Bill. In covering the March on Washington for CBS News, an 
obviously sympathetic Roger Mudd lamented on the air that 
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the votes just were not there and the bill would not pass.67 
As for the march itself, all of the major civil rights 
organizations participated, and on August 28, 1963, over 
250,000 people descended on Washington D.C.68  
 At the Lincoln Memorial, several speeches were given. 
The two that were most notable were the ones by John Lewis 
and Martin Luther King. In his speech, Lewis attacked the 
Administration for a lack of action on civil rights and 
promised violence if steps were not taken. This further 
demonstrated the rift between SCLC and SNCC, as Lewis was 
chairman of the students. King’s speech of course galvanized 
the world, and is perhaps one of the best orations in 
history, the “I Have a Dream” speech. 
 In September, the tensions in Birmingham had still not 
entirely dissipated. Schools were finally desegregated, but 
violence still seemed to be looming. During the first week 
of school there were no incidents. Then came the weekend. On 
Sunday morning, September 15, a bomb exploded inside the 
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16th Street Baptist Church.69 The explosion was very 
powerful, as, “…great chunks of stone shot through parked 
cars. The blast shattered the windshield of a passing car 
and knocked the driver unconscious.”70 When church members  
were clearing the debris, they stumbled across the bodies of 
four young girls. The four had been in the bathroom when the 
bomb exploded, and they were killed almost instantly.71 When 
the police arrived, they were immediately confronted by an 
angry mob who began to pelt them with rocks. The police 
fired over the heads of the crowd. Some youths were throwing 
stones at passing cars, and when ordered to stop, one of 
them, Johnny Robinson, began to run. He was shot and 
killed.72 Across town, two white youths killed a Black 
teenager, and violence continued to erupt throughout the 
night. By the time Sunday came to a conclusion, six people 
were dead, scores were injured, and there was rampant 
destruction across the city. 
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 Mayor Boutwell asked Governor Wallace for help, and 
Wallace dispatched Col. Al Lingo and a company of the 
Alabama National Guard into the city. Tensions cooled by the 
end of the year, however, and there were no major incidents 
of violence.         
  That may be due to that infamous November day when 
Kennedy was killed in Dallas. Suddenly the whole nation was 
thrown into a state of disbelief.  
Suddenly, in the wake of Kennedy’s death, the votes 
were there in Congress for President Lyndon Johnson to pass 
a Civil Rights Bill, and by March of 1964 the nation tuned 
in to see once again CBS correspondent Roger Mudd. The civil 
rights bill had passed the House and was in the Senate. 
Southern opponents were preparing for a filibuster, and CBS 
decided that Roger Mudd would provide saturation coverage of 
the move, guaranteeing that the story would be on television 
every night as long as the filibuster lasted.73 The debate 
began in late March and lasted until the middle of June. 
Mudd averaged five television pieces per day, and by the 
time the bill was passed, he had done 867 stories on it.74    
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  Birmingham became the model on how to conduct a civil 
rights campaign. While the local objectives were not 
completed, it was this campaign that applied the necessary 
pressure on the Administration to pass the Civil Rights Act 
in 1964.75 So, as the Movement headed into 1964 and 
Mississippi Freedom Summer, King took a much needed break 
and began to plan for the next campaign: voting rights.
                                                                                                                                                                             
74 Ibid., 248.  
75 377 U.S.(1964). 
  70 
 
CHAPTER 4 
AIN’T GONNA LET NO ONE TURN ME ROUND 
 
After a hectic schedule of travel for most of 1964, 
King and SCLC decided to focus on voting rights, and the  
city of Selma, Alabama, offered a good chance for success. 
In 1960, the Dallas County Voting League was established to 
register Black votes, but by 1964 only three percent of the 
Black population were registered voters, while White 
registration exceeded one hundred percent, a figure achieved 
by registering the deceased.1  In 1963, SNCC had implemented 
a project in Selma but was largely unsuccessful in their 
voting registration attempts, such as a 1964 voting rights 
march that resulted in widespread arrests of the 
demonstrators. After several years of government litigation 
and the best efforts of SNCC, only 353 or 2.1 percent of 
eligible black voters in Dallas County were registered.2 At 
that rate, King noted, “…it would take 103 years to register 
the adult Negroes.”3  In response, State Judge James Hare 
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issued a sweeping injunction prohibiting discussion of 
racial issues at any gathering of three or more people.4 One 
civil rights worker described the situation saying, “Selma 
is in a state of siege. Everywhere you look you see state 
policemen brandishing clubs and cattle prods.”5  
 In determining what to focus on after Birmingham and 
the passage of the Civil Rights Bill, SCLC concluded that 
because focusing on public accommodations had won the Civil 
Rights Act, then focusing on voting rights might help the 
movement ratify similar legislation. While Selma did not 
meet many of SCLC’s requirements because it was isolated and 
small, King nevertheless was impressed with the level of 
dedication of the citizens there. Andrew Young said that, 
“more people were committed to the movement before Martin’s 
arrival than after months of organizing and two weeks of  
demonstrations in Birmingham.”6     
In trying to decide how to best proceed in moving 
forward on the voting rights issue, SCLC board member C.T. 
Vivian reminded campaign organizers that, “We must have a 
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rallying point around which we can stir the whole nation.”7 
SCLC found the answer in Dallas County Sheriff Jim Clark. 
Clark was a die-hard segregationist in the Bull Connor mold 
and was anticipated to react in a similar hostile manner to 
direct action protests, resulting in the beatings and 
jailings that would lead to the eventual success of the 
campaign.8 In fact, Clark was so integral to the plan that 
one staffer joked that he should be put on the payroll.9  
King and the rest of the SCLC staff arrived in Selma on 
January 2, 1965. In his first act upon arrival, King gave 
his “Give Us the Ballot” speech before a filled congregation 
at Brown Chapel. The packed audience was an indication that 
the people of Selma were ready for confrontation. As King 
concluded his speech, he noted that Selma was, “a symbol of 
bitter resistance to the Civil Rights Movement in the Deep 
South.”10   
By Tuesday January 12, SNCC and SCLC were working 
feverishly to train and coordinate the volunteers to work  
the voting wards and attempt to register voters. Two nights  
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later, once again at Brown Chapel, King was drowned out by 
cheering as he pledged to, “be coming back again, and again, 
and again until…”11 He declared that the planned campaign 
called for registration drives in ten surrounding counties, 
and on the next Monday three things were going to happen. 
There would be a march through Selma to the courthouse, 
along with sending volunteers to apply for Whites-only jobs. 
Teams would also be sent out to try and desegregate hotels 
and restaurants under the civil rights law.12 King declared 
that Monday would be Freedom Day. Over the weekend Andrew 
Young met with police chief Wilson Baker. Baker was the 
chief of police for the city of Selma, while the more 
dangerous Clark controlled the county. Baker assured Young 
that on Monday the law would be enforced professionally.13 
That Monday, January 18, the first skirmish occurred. King 
led a group of about three hundred out of Brown Chapel to 
the courthouse. About a block from the church the march was 
stopped by Baker, where the marchers were given notice about 
the pedestrian traffic laws and warned that unless the 
marchers dissolved into groups of five or fewer at intervals 
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of ten feet they would be arrested. The marchers complied, 
and in this fashion continued to march to the courthouse, 
where they were confronted by Sheriff Clark. He escorted the 
marchers into the courthouse, past the registrar’s office, 
and herded them back onto the street.14 The integration of 
public accommodations went well, as workers attempted to 
desegregate restaurants, hotels, and other public 
establishments, there was no incident with local law 
enforcement. The SCLC feared that with no violence to cover, 
journalists would begin to leave and the movement’s ability 
to place pressure on Washington would be greatly reduced. 
Something dramatic needed to happen or the movement would 
more than likely lose momentum.  
Sheriff Clark had been quiet up to this point, but he 
could only be restrained for so long. During the march on 
January 19, he reacted. In an attempt to break up a SNCC-
SCLC march to the county courthouse, he ordered the crowd to 
disperse. When the crowd failed to do so, Clark grabbed a  
Black woman, Amelia Boynton, shoved her and placed her under 
arrest. About sixty people witnessed the incident and 
refused to leave, and Clark had them arrested as well.15  
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Unfortunately for him, a photograph of the incident appeared 
the next day in the pages of both the New York Times and the 
Washington Post, showing Clark with his billy club raised 
over her head.16  More confrontations occurred in late 
January. On January 20, three groups of would-be voters were 
arrested by Clark for obstructing the sidewalk, and two days 
later, more than one hundred school teachers were arrested 
protesting Boynton’s arrest.17    
On February 2, King led 250 marchers to the courthouse 
to protest the slowness of black voter registration, and 
upon arrival all of them were arrested by Public Safety 
Commissioner Wilson Baker. Baker personally arrested King to 
avoid the possible violence if the job was left to Clark. 
Upon hearing of King’s arrest, over five hundred children 
marched to the courthouse and were also arrested.18 Along 
with King, there were nearly eight hundred people in jail. 
Having the most recent recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in  
jail attracted media attention from all around the world and 
dramatically raised Selma into the consciousness of the 
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larger world.19 In addition, SCLC organized a group of 
fifteen concerned Congressmen, led by John Conyers and 
Charles Diggs from Detroit, to come to Selma to see what was 
happening. Accompanying the group was Assistant Attorney 
General Ramsey Clark, who confided to Andrew Young that the 
administration felt that it would not be possible to pass a 
voting rights bill at that time.20 
While King was in jail, the fiery Black Muslim leader 
Malcolm X arrived in Selma on February 3, appearing at the 
invitation of SNCC. Malcolm X, who would be killed in New 
York eighteen days later, gave a passionate speech in which 
he advocated meeting violence with violence, saying, “…the 
white people should thank Dr. King for holding people in 
check, for there are others who do not believe in these 
[nonviolent] measures.”21 However, in a private conversation 
with Coretta Scott King, Malcolm X assured her that he was 
trying to help the movement by showing America that if 
King’s way was not accepted, his was the alternative.22  
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That same day, President Johnson commented on Selma 
publicly for the first time. In his speech, the President 
said, “The loss of that [voting] right to a single citizen 
undermines the freedom of every citizen…I intend to see that 
that right is secured for every citizen.”23   
The Movement was also somewhat anxious due to a new 
decree from U.S. District Judge Daniel Thomas. Thomas ruled 
that the Alabama literacy test for voting eligibility be 
suspended, ordered Selma to take at least one hundred 
applicants per registration day, and guaranteed that all 
applications received by June 1 would be processed before 
July.24 King was skeptical but exhorted Young to continue 
marching to keep up the pressure.  
On February 5, King was released from jail. That day, 
his “Letter From a Selma Jail” appeared in the New York 
Times, where King wryly noted that there were more Blacks in  
jail in Selma than there were on the voter rolls.25 The very 
next day, in Washington, Press Secretary George Reedy 
disclosed the Johnson Administration’s intent to “strongly 
recommend” voting rights legislation before the end of the 
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year.26 On February 9, King flew to Washington to lobby 
further for a voting rights bill. During his visit, the 
Johnson Administration took great pains to assure King that 
the bill was beginning to move. King believed both Vice-
President Hubert Humpherey and Attorney General Nicholas 
Katzenbach, but he felt that the events in Alabama were 
unfolding too quickly, and the bill was moving too slowly.27 
King was right. In a rally at the courthouse in Selma 
on February 15, C.T. Vivian, who was leading the march, 
began comparing Sheriff Clark to Hitler, and while 
continuing to taunt him was suddenly struck in the face. 
Film of the incident made for what one commentator called, 
“vivid television.”28 Clark, while not recalling if he had 
in fact struck Vivian or not, later noted, “I lost my  
temper.”29 One SCLC staffer told the press that every time 
the movement in Selma seemed to be dying out, Sheriff Clark 
would come to the rescue.    
Vivian was invited to speak in the nearby town of 
Marion on February 18 about his confrontation with Clark. 
The meeting ended with a nighttime march, a dangerous 
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activity. The area was almost completely surrounded by 
police and angry white civilians. As the attack commenced, 
the streetlights went out. An eighty-two year old man, Cager 
Lee, had been severely beaten and was bleeding. His 
grandson, Jimmie Lee Jackson, a Vietnam veteran, rushed him 
to a café, and was trying to protect Lee and his mother. A 
policeman entered and a scuffle broke out. In the melee, 
Jackson’s mother was hit, and Jackson was hit in the face 
with a nightstick and shot in the stomach.30 Several other 
people were injured, including an NBC correspondent. This 
latest incident brought renewed national coverage into the 
campaign but seemed to take an emotional toll on the 
movement. To add to the sorrow, three days later Malcolm X 
was assassinated in New York.    
On Tuesday, February 23 in Washington, thirty-nine  
Republican leaders criticized the Johnson Administration for 
lacking focus on the civil rights issue. Jimmie Lee Jackson 
died that Friday, and unbeknownst to the Movement leaders, 
this was the catalyst for the climax of the Selma campaign.    
 That Sunday, two days after the death of Jackson, 
SCLC’S James Bevel suggested in a sermon that the campaign 
should be brought to Governor Wallace. He proposed a march 
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from Marion, the site of the shooting, to Montgomery. On 
Wednesday March 3, King delivered the eulogy for Jimmie Lee 
Jackson at Brown Chapel in Selma. In the course of his 
remarks, King promised the slain Jackson, “We will bring a 
voting bill into being on the streets of Selma.”31  
Meanwhile Governor Wallace began to attempt to stop any 
march by any means necessary. At a press conference, he 
announced that the state would prohibit the march, as it 
would tie up traffic on Route 80, and he put the highway 
patrol on alert.32 
 However, at this point the rift between SNCC and SCLC 
that started in Albany began to surface again. SNCC 
officials were not convinced that the march would be of any 
value. They feared both people being hurt and SCLC staging  
the march and then leaving town with nothing accomplished 
but more publicity for King. However, John Lewis and three 
other members of the Board of Directors elected to march as 
individuals. SNCC preferred to intensify the campaign around 
Selma, but the SCLC decided that the value of campaigning in 
the small town had been exhausted and decided something more 
dramatic was needed to focus attention on voting rights. It 
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was reasoned that the whole Alabama project had begun as a 
plan to get rid of George Wallace, so it seemed to make 
sense to take the campaign to Montgomery and put the 
spotlight on the Governor. 
  Early on Sunday March 7, the day of the march, King  
called Andrew Young and instructed him to postpone the march 
until Monday.33 King was tied up in Atlanta with other 
obligations and was uncomfortable not being there in case 
something went wrong. However, when Young arrived in Selma 
to relay the order, there were already about 500 people 
waiting to depart. Young decided that the massed police he 
had seen on the way into Selma would stop the march, and 
there would then be time to really do it later without SCLC 
losing any of the momentum.34 Young called King in Atlanta  
and appraised him of the situation. King reluctantly agreed 
to let the march take place but insisted that of his top 
four people in Selma, only two needed to go. King wanted at 
least two men from the leadership to stay behind in case 
anything went wrong.35  So, the 500 marchers met and left 
for the fifty-five mile trek to Montgomery. The marchers, 
led by SCLC lieutenant Hosea Williams and John Lewis of 
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SNCC, began to walk down Highway 80. As the marchers reached 
the Edmund Pettus Bridge, they were met by Alabama law 
enforcement personnel who were blocking the way. The 
marchers were ordered to disperse by Major John Cloud, head 
of the state police. He gave them three minutes, and after 
one and a half minutes, the marchers were advanced upon by 
the police. They were pushed back with tear gas, night 
sticks, men on horseback, and sheer brute force. The day 
became known as “Bloody Sunday,” the single most brutal day 
of repression in the history of the Civil Rights Movement. 
Television cameras were on hand to record the event, and ABC 
News cut into the Sunday Night Movie, which ironically was 
about anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany, Judgement at Nuremberg,  
to show the viewers the carnage in Alabama.36 When the day 
was over, John Lewis suffered a fractured skull, seventeen 
other demonstrators were hospitalized for injuries, and 
another forty marchers were treated for their injuries and 
then released.37 In the wake of the violence and his split 
skull, John Lewis said, “I don’t see how President Johnson 
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can send troops to Vietnam…and can’t send troops to Selma, 
Alabama.”38    
This was almost too much for the country to bear. In 
Congress, Minnesota Senator Walter Mondale declared that the 
latest act of violence made passing of the voting rights act 
imperative. In Montgomery, an angry Governor Wallace 
viciously criticized Clark in private for letting the 
situation spiral to such extremes,39 but, to the public, 
Wallace downplayed what happened, saying that the incident, 
“should make it evident to the Negro people …that King and 
other leaders who ask them to break the law are always 
absent from the violence as he was today.”40   
King would not back down. SCLC planned another march  
for the following Tuesday, but that morning in federal 
court, Judge Frank Johnson prohibited the day’s march until 
a Thursday hearing on a motion made by SCLC to forbid 
Governor Wallace from interfering with the planned march. To 
make matters worse, SCLC and SNCC were at odds over tactics. 
This time, SNCC was all for the march, and King was well 
aware of the antagonism to the presence of SCLC in what had 
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begun as a SNCC campaign. So, blocked by a federal court 
order, as well as a public exhortation by the President of 
the United States urging delaying of the march King had to 
make a decision. Despite all that was arrayed against the 
idea of the march, King decided to proceed anyway. People 
from all over the country had come to Selma in a show of 
support, and SCLC could not waver, nor could they risk a 
public disagreement with SNCC.  
So, on March 9, King and about 900 marchers set off 
again. Soon, the march grew to about 1,500. However, the 
enthusiasm generated by the march, the cries of, “ain’t 
gonna let no one turn me round!”41 were soon extinguished. 
As the marchers once again reached the Edmund Pettus Bridge, 
they were once again ordered to stop by Major Cloud. In 
response, King knelt and asked Ralph Abernathy to lead the  
crowd in prayer. When Abernathy concluded, King rose and 
began to walk back into Selma.42 Activists were livid. They 
felt that something was wrong, and SNCC accused King of 
making a secret agreement with the federal government. King 
defended his action by saying he was planning to proceed 
with the march, but that when he learned that police 
violence was once again imminent the march would stop, 
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“having made our point, revealing the continued presence of 
violence…hoping, finally that the national administration in 
Washington would feel and respond.”43 
However, in the court hearing Thursday, King was forced 
to reveal that by a tacit agreement made that fateful 
morning, King had agreed to stop the march and go back to 
Selma. This would allow for no violence and room for further 
dialogue.  
However, violence did occur in the aftermath of the 
aborted march. Three Unitarian ministers were beaten, one of 
them, James Reeb, fatally, and the Ku Klux Klan were blamed. 
Unlike the earlier death of Jimmie Lee Jackson, Reeb’s death 
made national headlines and once again inspired a national 
outrage. This irony was not lost to those on the movement.  
Stokely Carmichael pointed out, “…what you want is the 
nation to be upset when anybody is killed…it’s almost for 
this to be recognized, a white person must be killed. What 
does that say?”44  
 In the wake of the death of Reeb, President Johnson was 
eager to act. With the spectacle of segregationist violence 
in the forefront of national attention, the President felt 
confident he could pass the voting rights bill and finish 
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the “second reconstruction.”  That Saturday Governor Wallace 
flew to Washington to confer with President Johnson.  After 
a nonproductive meeting, during which Wallace tried to say 
that it was the demonstrators that were the real problem in 
Alabama, Johnson became angry. Wallace, however, did give 
Johnson the excuse he needed to intervene by claiming the 
state of Alabama did not have the resources to protect the 
marchers. That was all Johnson needed, so he charmed the 
Alabama Governor for a few minutes and then he escorted 
Wallace out. Wallace said later, “If I hadn’t left when I 
did, he’d have had me coming out for civil rights.”45 The 
President then went to the Rose Garden, where he delivered  
his first press conference since “Bloody Sunday.” In his 
remarks, he commented that, “…the nation had witnessed a 
very deep and painful challenge to the unending search for 
American freedom,” and went on to say that those events, 
“highlighted a deep and very unjust flaw in American 
democracy.”46 As he concluded, the now riled up President 
went to the office of Attorney General Katzenbach and told 
him to, “…write the god-damndest toughest voting rights act  
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that you can think of.”47 
    The following Monday President Johnson addressed a 
special joint session of Congress. It was the first time in 
19 years a president had specifically addressed Congress on 
a domestic issue. On national television, to an audience of 
seventy million, Johnson stated his beliefs in some stirring 
words. After placing Selma alongside Lexington and Concord 
and Appomattox as turning points in “man’s unending search 
for freedom,” Johnson went on: 
 What happened in Selma is part of a far larger movement 
which reaches into every section and state of America. 
It is the effort of the American Negro to secure for 
themselves the full blessings of American life.48  
 
 It was a stirring display of rhetoric and, along with 
the outrage over Selma, almost assured that the voting 
rights legislation would pass. David Lewis wrote that, “No  
President had ever spoken so feelingly of the overdue rights 
of the American Black or more unequivocally…than Lyndon 
Johnson.”49            
   Two days later on the 16th, Judge Frank Johnson heard 
arguments for the long delayed Selma to Montgomery march. 
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During the hearing, SCLC tried to make it clear that they 
were expanding every effort to prepare an orderly and  
nonviolent march to the capital. Two days later, Judge 
Johnson authorized the long-awaited Selma to Montgomery 
march and explicitly ordered Governor Wallace not to 
interfere. He allowed SCLC as many marchers as they wished 
on the four lane portions of Highway 80 but limited them to 
300 marchers on the portions of the highway that were two 
lane. Later on that same day, Johnson finally sent his 
voting rights bill to Congress.  
The march began on March 21, and Wallace was completely 
powerless to stop it. SCLC planned for a five-day time 
schedule and set up campsites and logistical support to 
accommodate the expected numbers. That day, in the glare of 
the national spotlight, 3,500 people departed from Brown’s 
Chapel. Leaders from every major civil rights organization 
were present along with celebrities such as Ralph Bunche and 
Harry Belafonte. Along the route, Alabama National Guardsman 
were posted to ensure the safety of the people, and as the 
first day was over, many people departed back for Selma, 
including Dr. King, who had several speaking engagements 
that he simply had to make.50 As the march went through its 
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second, third, and fourth day, the numbers dwindled until 
the 300 remained as ordered by Judge Johnson. 30,000 people 
participated and reached Montgomery that Thursday. In a 
stirring speech on the steps of the state capitol building 
broadcast live on the three national television networks, 
King proclaimed that they had made it, and were there to 
demonstrate, “…that here we are, standing before the forces 
of power in Alabama saying, ‘We ain’t gonna let nobody turn 
us ‘round.’”51  
The march seemed to end on a high note, but that night, 
a woman, Viola Liuzzo, was carpooling people back to Selma 
and was shot through the head and killed by a carload of 
Klansmen. Within hours, the FBI discovered that one of its  
informants had been in the car, and by eight A.M. the next 
morning the case had been solved.52 The next day on 
television, President Johnson announced that the four men in 
the car had been arrested, and the case was solved, as well 
as issuing a condemnation of the Ku Klux Klan, whom Johnson 
characterized as a threat to the peace of every community 
they operated in.53  
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Support for the voting rights bill increased in the 
wake of the violence. The only issue that delayed speedy 
passage was a debate over whether the ban on the use of the 
poll tax was unconstitutional. So, the Justice Department 
filed lawsuits in the four states where the poll tax was 
still used, Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia.54 
Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia told one of his aides, “You 
know, you can’t stop this bill. We can’t deny the Negro a 
basic constitutional right to vote.”55  
 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 passed the Senate two 
months after the march on May 26 by a vote of seventy-seven 
to nineteen, and the House passed it after five weeks of 
debate on July 9.56 Johnson signed it into law on August 6 
in a ceremony in the President’s Room off the Capitol 
Rotunda, in the same room where Abraham Lincoln had signed 
the Emancipation Proclamation one hundred four years 
earlier.57 
 In the summer following the passage of the Voting 
Rights Act, 9,000 Blacks in Dallas County had gained the 
ability to vote. Sheriff Jim Clark was voted out of office. 
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 “In truth,” wrote King biographer Stephen Oates, “…the 
Selma Campaign was the Movement’s finest hour, was King’s 
finest hour.”58 In many respects this statement is true. The 
Selma Campaign applied the public pressure that  
President Johnson needed to force the voting rights 
legislation through Congress, and it affirmed the basic 
ideals of nonviolent direct action to apply pressure for 
social change. The Selma campaign, much like Birmingham, was 
not a total success locally. Problems there were not 
resolved by the campaign, but once again, like Birmingham, 
the campaign did much to facilitate national movement.
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 Author Hunter S. Thompson once wrote, “A prime 
intention of any left/radical demonstration is to provoke 
the minions of the establishment (the police) to violence, 
and thus expose the brutality and hypocrisy of an 
establishment that claims to stand for peace and 
democracy.”1 While Thompson was writing in regard to the 
riots at the Democratic National Convention in 1968, his 
observation on the purpose of demonstrating is correct.  
 For the Civil Rights Movement the revolution was 
televised. Beginning with the Little Rock Crisis in 1957, 
almost all of the key moments of the civil rights movement 
in the late fifties and early sixties were caught by 
television cameras. By broadcasting what happened, these 
images, some orchestrated, such as the March on Washington, 
and some, like “Bloody Sunday” in Selma, totally 
spontaneous, changed the perception that the United States 
had of itself.   
 Even in the South the difference was felt. In 1955 only 
twenty percent of those polled were in favor of school 
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desegregation, but in 1964 62 percent of Southerners favored 
the civil rights bill as long as it was implemented 
gradually.2 This was a staggering change of heart, 
especially to come about in just over a decade. 
 In Albany, the Civil Rights Movement suffered defeat 
thanks to the tactics of Sheriff Laurie Prichett. However, 
it was this failure that led to the later more successful 
campaigns in Birmingham and Selma. The Albany campaign 
showed King what was necessary to bring national attention 
to the segregated South. He needed headlines that 
demonstrated the cruelty and injustice of segregation. While 
Albany in and of itself was not a victory for the movement, 
it did provide the education that led to the success in 
Birmingham. 
 The Birmingham campaign was the most important campaign 
of the modern Civil Rights Movement. While the concessions 
made by the city were small, it was this campaign that led 
to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 Bull Connor 
lost all control over the city as well as any credibility he 
had when the national media caught the images and events of 
the “D-Day” demonstrations. With the nation finally 
understanding what the South was perpetuating with 
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segregation, the system of depriving people their rights 
very quickly eroded. 
 In Selma, Jim Clark endured a similar fate to that Bull 
Connor had. With the debacle at the Edmund Pettus Bridge, 
Selma was a lost campaign for the remnants of segregation. 
Once again, the images of American citizens being beaten 
while simply protesting for the rights that had already been 
granted in the Constitution shocked the nation. This outrage 
was enough to allow President Johnson to pass the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965.4 
 In the early 1960s all of the key elements for success 
in achieving equality for Black Americans came together. 
With national media, dynamic leadership, a mass following, 
and allies within the federal government all playing key 
roles, Black Americans came closer to the promise of living 
in a nation, “where all men are created equal.”
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